Biodiversity offsetting – en vogue in Madagascar? by Waeber, PO
MADAGASCAR CONSERVATION & DEVELOPMENT VOLUME 7 | ISSUE 3 — DECEMBER 2012 PAGE 110 
EDITORIAL                   http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/mcd.v7i3.1
Biodiversity offsetting – 
en vogue in Madagascar?
In August I attended the International Primatological Society 
meeting in Mexico. During the session devoted to lemurs, there 
was an intriguing presentation on lemur conservation in the min-
ing area of Ambatovy, some 80 km east of Antananarivo. Among 
other fauna, a remarkable 16 lemur species have been recorded 
there, including the IUCN Critically Endangered Prolemur simus 
and the Endangered Propithecus diadema. According to the 
company website, Ambatovy is a “large - tonnage, long - life nickel 
and cobalt mining enterprise located in Madagascar. Total proj-
ect cost is US$ 6.3 billion, making Ambatovy the largest - ever 
foreign investment in the country – and one of the biggest in 
sub - Saharan Africa and the Indian Ocean region. Once fully 
operational, it will have the annual capacity to produce 60,000 
tonnes of refined nickel, 5,600 tonnes of cobalt and 210,000 
tonnes of ammonium sulphate fertilizer.” This will position the 
Ambatovy project among the world’s most productive lateritic 
nickel mines. Clearly on the payroll of the mining company, the 
presenter showed a map of the Sherritt mining area, reveal-
ing among other features, a conservation area for biodiversity 
offsetting some 70 km northeast of the mining site. This got me 
wondering: it seems quite a distance from the mining site, in 
other words, the biological / ecological conditions may be differ-
ent. So how exactly is biodiversity offsetting working?
Biodiversity offsets are conservation measures imple-
mented to compensate for the residual biodiversity losses 
caused by development activities. This entails ‘adequate’ 
compensation in form of upgrading the environmental value 
of other sites. The ‘successful’ upgrading or reconstruction 
of valuable habitat is documented through permits which are 
issued by an authorized agency ensuring that quality standards 
are met (Wissel and Wätzold 2010). The conceptual assumption 
behind offsetting is that degraded natural environments can be 
balanced by conserving ‘pristine’ nature, or, using Brockington 
and Duffy’s (2010) notion of a “global virtual ledger” on which a 
quantitative balancing of beneficial and adverse environmental 
actions is carried out. So, how are compensatory mechanisms 
applied when dealing with biodiversity? Its conceptual complex-
ity renders delineating physical boundaries of ecosystem 
functions and services extremely challenging, and to assign 
virtual price tags to single systemic elements or values and to 
relatively weight their contribution to the entire ‘biodiversity’ 
(Kosoy and Corbera 2010). Common offsetting schemes tend 
to abstract biodiversity into tangible, itemized proxies such as 
‘habitat hectares’, or they may favor certain flagship species, for 
example lemurs – hence engaging in what Castree (2003) calls 
“trading [off] biodiversity elements”. Trade - offs can be decided 
empirically, by identifying ecological thresholds, assessing 
vulnerability, or defining uniqueness (e.g., endemism, irreplace-
ability, etc.) of components of elements of biodiversity, such as 
species. Oftentimes single metrics (e.g., monetary value) are 
used to quantify biodiversity values in such a context (Hirsch 
et al. 2011). However, biodiversity trade - offs extend beyond the 
pure economic value dimension (cf. Gowdy 1997), adding to 
the complexity analysing and assessing trade - offs. International 
standards are required to ensure best practice and transparency 
of biodiversity offsetting. It is similar to the more known Carbon 
offsetting in that both are trying to mitigate or reduce impacts (of 
emission for the latter mechanism). However, the greenhouse 
gases are more uniform and less complex than ‘biodiversity’ 
and therefore represent a better tradable commodity on an 
international level (ten Kate et al. 2004).
Madagascar is extremely rich in minerals as Tsilavo Raha-
rimahefa in this issue depicted when discussing Madagascar’s 
geoconservation and geodiversity (Raharimahefa 2012). During 
the past decade, large - scale mining has grown considerably 
in the country (e.g., Cardiff and Andriamanalina 2007). This is 
partly because of the Large Mining Investment Act (cf. Sarrasin 
2006). According to the World Bank 2010 report, Madagascar 
is only just about to enter a large - scale exploitation phase 
where relatively easy rentals and revenues for government 
(Malagasy) are assured from industrial mining since respective 
transnational industries have sophisticated administrative and 
governance structures in place. “Companies may be motivated 
[i.e., by self - interest] to offset the harm they are causing when 
transforming biodiversity on a purely voluntary basis.” (ten Kate 
et al. 2004: 38). They do so in order to increase efficiency in 
terms of acquiring necessary permits for development projects 
(such as industrial mining) and to enhance global reputation 
(“we are practicing conservation and improving local economy 
by creating many jobs”), and to secure social licenses with 
stakeholders (ten Kate and Inbar 2008). Many of these compa-
nies aim to reduce rates of biodiversity loss, by promoting a 
‘no net loss’ of biodiversity, or even to achieve a ‘net positive 
impact’ following destructive activities (Rio Tinto 2004, 2008, 
TEEB 2010). Best practices (following the mitigation hierarchy 
of avoiding, minimizing, restoring, offsetting) to achieve such 
highly staked goals are formulated by the BBOP (Business and 
Biodiversity Offsets Programme), an international collabora-
tion between companies of the extractive industries, financial 
institutions such as the International Finance Corporation (a 
member of the World Bank Group) or the Global Environment 
Fund, government and non-governmental agencies (e.g., Birdlife 
International, Conservation International, International Union for 
Conservation of Nature, Wildlife Conservation Society), and civil 
societies (BBOP 2012).
In conclusion, when perusing the list of NGOs active in 
Madagascar that are engaging with the extractive industries, it is 
apparent that there seem to be more than just a business oppor-
tunity involved to engage in biodiversity conservation (offset-
ting) in Madagascar. There are two main risks to emphasize in 
this regard: (i) A great deal of uncertainty remains, i.e., it is not 
assured that the compensatory mechanisms or conservation 
activities on a different patch (one which is connected or not 
with the developed /mined patch) will create a no net loss or 
even a net positive impact: only time will tell (e.g., Johst et al. 
2012). (ii) Land development activities (extractive mining) contin-
ues to harm biodiversity. What has changed in the past years is 
the marketing strategy employed by the extractive industries: 
it uses the same narrative and presentation as conservation 
organizations (for in - depth examples and case studies, refer to 
Seagle 2012, Evers and Seagle 2012). These narratives are too 
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often used to shoulder farmers or the impoverished rural people 
as culprits of deforestation or other environmental destruction 
(Horning 2012, this issue) while in reality, land and patch conver-
sions are supported by governments and the conservation 
community. I do not wish to engage in a blame game, but rather, 
would like to point out the risks of falling too easily into the one 
or the other narrative to deflect from actual issues. Biodiversity 
offsetting in Madagascar seems to be coming into vogue in 
the years ahead. Therefore, it appears logical to delve more 
deeply into models such as ‘Zones of intermediality’, proposed 
by Sandra Evers in this issue, where all different stakeholders 
engaged in a resource interaction (such as biodiversity offset-
ting) are profiled in a holistic and respectful way (Evers 2012).
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